After the Storm - Winter Storm Fern

Hello readers, I have been waiting, watching, and collecting facts so I could talk about Fern once she was done. This was certainly a historic storm; it didn’t quite reach the impact of Elliot in the North, but one could certainly argue that it was Uri-East with its impact on TVA core distribution area. Texas got a last second reprieve as the storm impact pulled North leaving Texas with mostly rain.

This is going to be a deep dive, which means a lot of technical jargon. If you are looking for a less technical summary there are a number of excellent write ups on Substack like “The Renewable IN-FERN-O”, “Don’t Look North”, and “The Texas Freeze: An Early Update”.

So, let’s break this storm down into parts, so it makes sense.

Casualties

Let’s start with the human cost, because a life cannot be replaced. Jim Cantore of the Weather Channel predicted that there would be roughly 200 casualties from Fern before the storm began. That means we went in knowing people would die, and there was very little that could be done to prevent it; it’s baked in the cake. Regardless we should talk about it:

1. .At the time this was posted for publication, the casualty count for Fern stood at 153 souls;

   1. Hypothermia/Exposure: ~50-60

      1. New York has the largest count at 10

      2. Louisiana has 5 confirmed.

      3. South Carolina: 5-6

   2. Cardiac Events (Snow Shoveling/Snow Removal): 8-10

      1. Pennsylvania 3

      2. New York 1

      3. New Jersey 1

      4. Tennessee 1

      5. Kentucky 1

   3. Traffic Accidents (Ice/Weather-Related): 15-20

      1. Tennessee: Multiple (Dyersburg crash + 160+ total crashes, 18 injured)

      2. Iowa: 1 (17-year-old)

      3. Indiana: 1 (17-year-old)

      4. Virginia: 2

      5. Louisiana: 1

   4. Carbon Monoxide Poisoning: 2-3

      1. Louisiana: 2 confirmed (including 86-year-old with generator in garage)

   5. Medical Equipment Failure (Power Outage): 1-2

      1. Louisiana: 1 confirmed (79-year-old, oxygen concentrator failure)

   6. Drowning (Falling Through Ice): 3

      1. Texas: 3 brothers (ages 6, 8, 9) in a Fannin County pond

   7. Recreational Vehicle Accidents: 4-5

      1. Texas: 2 (16-year-old girls, sledding with car)

      2. Arkansas: 2 (ATV-related, ages 17 and 40)

   8. Aviation: 6

      1. Maine: 6 (Bombardier Challenger 650 crash on takeoff, Bangor)

   9. House fires: 2

   10. Unknown/Under Investigation: ~40-50

Note: The significant increase in casualties from initial reports includes substantial state totals that were not broken down by cause type. Mississippi reported 29 deaths, Tennessee 25, and Kentucky 15, but did not specify the causes of death in their official reports.

Without question over the coming weeks as the snow melts and mail piles up, more casualties will be found.

Next: Power Outages

As feared, the ice storm within Fern wreaked havoc. Fortunately for Texas in the last hours before the storm started, the bulk of the ice pulled North and East, completely missing the ERCOT footprint. Several counties in Northeastern Texas did deal with significant outages caused by ice in the Piney Woods area, but this area is not served by ERCOT. Texas was able to respond quickly and power was restored largely within 48 hours. At the height of the storm, more than 1 million customers were without power

Outages on 1/25/26

Where the ice struck the hardest was in the core of the TVA service territory. TVA does not deliver power directly to customers; it sells to small REAs, PUDs, and MUDs. These public power agencies lack the manpower and funding of the large IOU utilities. Their Distribution is primarily overhead and often rural. So, an ice storm of this magnitude disproportionately impacts their systems, and they lack the resources to respond quickly. One week after the storm, over 154 thousand customers remained without power in the South-Central region. Worst impact was Tennessee where almost 54 thousand had been out of power for a week in single digit temperatures. Nashville Electric was the single hardest hit utility in the Nation by the ice storm. Home standby generators sales should be strong in the South this summer

South Central Outages on 1/31/26

Next: Fuel

Coal generation once again proved its worth; all the standby coal plants were fired up and online across MISO, PJM, and ERCOT. Even the small remaining coal generation in NYISO and ISONE was online. Enough coal generation was online for the EIA and EPRI to take special notice. I can’t speak to ERCOT, but it wouldn’t surprise me if their coal was running as well.

Oil played a surprising significant part in the overall generation mix. ISONE ran their oil generation full out and traded on natural gas. NYISO is less transparent; their dual fuel units played a significant role in the energy mix, but it is unknown which fuel they were burning. Even PJM picked up a decent amount of oil and dual fuel generation in their mix; these usually are too small of a contribution to even notice. There were some generation swings back and forth between coal and oil that suggested there may have been some fuel switching taking place. PJM demonstrated they were concerned about fuel oil reserves by issuing this notice

For ISONE and NYISO it’s difficult to tell how much of their oil reserve they burned through and if they can resupply in a timely manner. Typically, oil is purchased and delivered pre-season; we are talking about massive quantities of fuel, both light oil (gas turbines) and HFO (boilers). If any of our readers have an update, enlighten us.

Next; Alerts, TLRs, Emission Permits, and Demand Response

Here we break down the system orders that were issued and system alerts that occurred. Early in the storm MISO entered into an EEA2 alert twice on the first day. This was driven by a missed forecast that failed to secure enough resources and exceptionally low wind generation. The lack of wind generation may not have been related to wind, but temperature. Non-winterized wind turbines are forced offline at -20°C to -30°C, and winterized wind turbines at -30°C to -40°C. The largest factor is lack of lubricant flow in the gearbox. Ambient temperatures were easily approaching these critical points.

ISONE ran under a MLCC/2 order which was essentially a no touch order for the entire week of the arctic intrusion. A copy of the order is pasted below.

NYISO is hard to read; they do not have an app, and they do not make their market reliability messages public.

PJM was busy;

1. They started out with a cold weather alert on 1/2.

2. Then a Maintenance Outage Recall on 1/21.

3. After that, a Special Message to Dual Fuel and Oil-Fired generation with special instructions if they had limited on-site fuel on 1/22, posted above.

4. A conservative Operations Order was issued on 1/22.

5. Then a series of Demand Response instructions to Dominion, Pepco, and BGE to relieve local transmission overloading on 1/25. Regarding this dispatch, note that Brandon Shores is still running under a RMR contract, and Wagner is running under a 202C order, both over the objections of the Maryland government. Without this coal fired generation, this situation would have likely led to load shedding.

6. A Transmission Loading Relief (TLR) was issued for the Cloverdale Jackson 765kV line between AEP and Dominion on 1/2.

7. On 1/26 PJM issued a maximum generation emergency and an EEA1. This gave operators additional ability to purchase energy.

8. Also, on 1/26 PJM issued a system wide low voltage alert due to heavy loading.

9. A TLR was issued on the AEP-Dom Flowgate 59 on 1/31.

The headline from Reuters appears to be more of a shock headline to sell papers, than anything with substance. PJM reported 21GW of forced outages, less than half of the 46GW forced off during Elliot, and there was no shedding during either storm. Keep in mind this amount includes renewable generation. However, with the added data center load, a 46GW generation loss would have been a disaster.

The EPA issued notice to virtually all the RTOs relaxing air permit limits so generation could run beyond the maximum limits allowed by their EPA permits. This would likely apply to operating in oil fired mode for dual fueled units, as well as coal and straight oil-fired generation. Some natural gas fired peaking turbines also have maximum hour run limits in the EPA air permits. This will have a knock-on effect as soon as the EPA notices expire; many of these units will have exhausted their permit limits for the year.

In a surprise move, the DOE issued a letter announcing intent to employ standby generators to help relieve system stress in times of high load. The letter was written in cooperation with PJM. Per PJM, data center backup power is the primary target, although that is not spelled out in the DOE letter. You can download a copy HERE. Read the PJM reaction HERE.

Next; More Weather

Fern was followed quickly by Gianna on 1/31, which impacted the areas of The Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida that Fern missed. There were significant power outages in Northern Florida for 48 hours following the storm, but by Monday afternoon the situation had improved considerably with less than 10 thousand still without power. There is talk of another major arctic air incursion mid-February. If so, this winter is very much going to test our fuel reserves.

Next; LMP Prices

Again, Texas seemed to fair well, but the rest of the RTO’s Local Marginal Price (LMP) hung out in the $150MWH to $600MWH range all week, usually closer to the top than the bottom. That is going to translate to some stiff energy bills for customers who have variable commodity-based energy pricing for their power. If you are one of them, it’s going to be ugly, there’s no way around it. This should have less impact on your delivery charges, but it depends on how your state has your utility rates constructed. Transmission was expensive over this run.

Conclusions

We survived for the most part. There was probably little that could have been done to stop the Ice damage in the TVA region. Undergrounding utilities is uber expensive and generally out of reach of most small public power entities. In rural areas, it would be nearly impossible physically even if you had a fat budget. There was no firm load shedding; no major power sources tripped. The power system showed all the signs of being pushed to the edge, but it held. The stress appears to be centered around the AEP, Dominion, Pepco, and BGE interface where the massive North Virginia data center complex draws its energy. If trouble is expected, it is a good place to throw your dart.

I hope you found this storm review enlightening, please leave me a like and a comment. Thank you for reading my Substack.